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Abstract—Link-flooding attack (LFA) has emerged as a serious threat to Internet which cuts off connections between legitimate hosts
and targeted servers by flooding only a few links (e.g., target links). Several mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate LFA,
however, they can only mitigate LFA after target links have been compromised by adversaries. Based on the fact that adversaries rely
on network linkmap to discover weakness of the network, in this paper, we propose an active LFA mitigation mechanism, called
Linkbait, that actively and preventively mitigates LFA by providing a fake linkmap to adversaries. Inspired by Moving Target Defense
(MTD), we propose a link obfuscation algorithm in Linkbait that selectively reroutes probing flows to hide target links from adversaries
and mislead them to consider some bait links as target links. By providing the faked linkmap to adversaries, Linkbait can actively
mitigate LFA even without identifying bots and does not affect flows from legitimate hosts. In order to further reduce the junk traffic
generated by adversaries from entering the network, we propose a bot detection algorithm in Linkbait that extracts unique traffic
patterns from LFA and leverages Support Vector Machine to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. Finally, we evaluate the
feasibility of implementing Linkbait in real Internet, and evaluate its performance by using both a real-world testbed and large-scale
simulations. The analyses and experiments results demonstrate the effectiveness of Linkbait.
Index Terms—Link-flooding attack, Obfuscation, DDoS defense
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Botnet-driven distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) at-
tack [1], [2], which consumes resources of targeted servers
to cause a denial of service (DoS) attack for legitimate hosts,
is one of the most serious threats to the Internet because
it always leverages legitimate TCP-like flows to launch
attacks. A recent example of DDoS attack is that the Mirai
botnets brought down much of America’s internet in 2016
and was likely the largest of its kind in history [3]. A new
type of DDoS attack, called link-flooding attack (LFA), has
been proposed recently [4], [5], which is even more difficult
to be detected or mitigated. Unlike traditional DDoS attacks
which mainly consume the resources of the end targets,
LFA utilizes distributed botnets to deplete the bandwidth
of certain network links (e.g., target links) to disconnect
entire domains from the Internet. To be precise, it does
not attack the end targets directly, but instead depletes the
bandwidth of target links, which makes the detection and
defense systems at the end servers irrelevant.
The bots manipulated by an adversary send TCP-like
flows to the target area just as legitimate users do. Because
of its indirectly attack strategy, the victims may not receive
any malicious traffic even they are under attacks. Moreover,
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it is challenging to distinguish between bots and legitimate
hosts because the bots can also use valid IP addresses and
the low-rate attack flows from each bot conform to the
Internet protocol. With these unique characteristics, LFA has
quickly emerged in real-world attacks [6], [7], and it is very
difficult to be detected or mitigated by traditional defense
mechanisms.
LFA has attracted the great attention of researchers and
some works recently have been proposed to detect and
mitigate it [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
However, existing mechanisms mainly try to mitigate LFA
by simply imposing policies on all traffic instead of differen-
tiating flooding traffic from legitimate traffic with different
rules. In addition, all these mechanisms take effects after
networks have been congested, which cannot guarantee the
availability of target links or thoroughly thwart adversaries’
intention of introducing congestions to the network, even
some of them are able to backtrack bots after LFA happens.
Therefore, it is urgently needed to design a preventive
mechanism that captures adversaries’ intention early and
treats their flows with special policies in advance, so that
we can preventively mitigate LFA without target links being
congested by adversaries.
The mainstream of LFA (e.g., the Cross Fire attack [5])
relies on the linkmap of the network to figure out target
links and then launches LFA effectively. That is, the core is
to build an accurate linkmap of the network. In order to
obtain an accurate linkmap, an adversary will manipulate
all his bots to send probing flows to the network to gather
the link information towards as many servers in the target
area as possible. However, a legitimate host usually would
not gather link information like the adversary does. Thus,
we argue that this process becomes an important pattern
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
09
52
1v
2 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 4 
Ju
l 2
01
7
2that can be used to distinguish bots from legitimate hosts.
Moreover, if we could mislead the adversary to build a
wrong linkmap, LFA will inevitably miss fire.
In this paper, we propose an active link obfuscation
mechanism, called Linkbait, to actively mitigate LFA by
providing a fake linkmap to adversaries. Inspired by Mov-
ing Target Defense (MTD) [17] [18], we propose a link
obfuscation algorithm in Linkbait by selectively rerouting
probing flows to obfuscate links, so that target links are
hidden from adversaries and some bait links are misjudged
as target links by adversaries. Since adversaries rely on
the linkmap to discover target links and launch attacks, a
fake linkmap will force adversaries to miss fire inevitably.
Linkbait uses several bait links to fake target links which
could attract attentions from adversaries while hiding the
true target links, so that LFA can be avoided in advance
without target links being compromised by adversaries. In
particular, our bait link construction strategy and selectively
flow rerouting policy reduce the probability of bait links
being congested by flooding attacks. Furthermore, in order
to reduce the junk traffic generated by adversaries from
entering target links, we propose a bot detection algorithm
that extracts unique traffic patterns from LFA and leverages
SVM to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. In
this way, we propose a pre-congestion LFA mitigation and
detection system, while the precursors focused on digging
out adversaries after critical information are leaked or the
network has been compromised.
In order to realize our mechanism, there are three major
challenges that need to be addressed.
• Link obfuscation: Linkbait intends to hide target links
and use bait inks to fake target links. However,
numerous flows are randomly distributed in the net-
work. How to distract the attention of the adversary
from true target links to bait link is a challenging
problem.
• LFA resistance for bait links: Linkbait uses dynamic
rerouting to mislead adversaries to build a fake
linkmap. The bait links will be exposed to and at-
tacked by the adversary on behalf of target links,
which may suffer from congestion and further affect
the flows from legitimate hosts. Therefore, how to
construct the bait links without suffering congestion
in the network is challenging.
• Pre-congestion bot detection: Linkbait tries to detect
bots before the links are compromised by the ad-
versary, which is totally different from existing LFA
mitigation works detecting bots after the congestion
happens. Hence, using only the attack pattern is not
sufficient to detect bots. Moreover, it is possible that
some legitimate hosts are identified as bots. There-
fore, how to achieve an accurate bot detection while
minimizing the false positive rate is a challenging
problem.
We propose Linkbait to solve these challenges, and the
main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel LFA mitigation mechanism,
called Linkbait, to preventively mitigate LFA before
it starts to congest the network. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to distinguish suspi-
cious hosts before flooding happens by intention-
ally providing a fake linkmap. In addition, we treat
suspicious hosts with different rules so as to avoid
them further introducing congestions to our net-
work, which is totally different from existing works.
• We propose two link algorithms for Linkbait. The
first is link grouping algorithm which aims at finding
suitable links to build bait links in the network,
and the second is link obfuscation algorithm that
selectively reroutes probing flows to hide target links
from adversaries and mislead them to consider some
bait links as target links. By providing the faked
linkmap to adversaries, Linkbait can actively mit-
igate LFA without affecting legitimate flows from
legitimate hosts.
• We propose a bot detection algorithm which extracts
unique traffic features from both the linkmap con-
struction phase and the flooding phase, and leverage
SVM to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate
hosts.
• We evaluate the performance of Linkbait with im-
plementation in a software defined network (SDN)
testbed and large-scale simulations. The experimen-
tal results show that Linkbait can effectively mitigate
LFA with a very low network latency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the system model and the background of LFA in
Section 3. We present the design of Linkbait in Section 4
and the security analysis in Section 5. We then evaluate the
performance of Linkbait in Section 6. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly discuss the state-of-the-art of LFA
detection and mitigation. After Kang et al. proposed the
Cross Fire attack [5], many works on LFA detection and mit-
igation have been proposed and they mainly focus on two
aspects of LFA: flooding traffic and probing information.
Mitigation on flooding traffic: Lee et al. proposed
Codef [9], a collaborative defense mechanism between au-
tonomous systems (ASes) to mitigate LFA. However, the
coordination between ASes or ISPs is not readily available
yet due to their competitive relationship and the latency
in cooperation. Liaskos et al. proposed a novel framework
which implements online traffic engineering (TE) and con-
tinuously re-routes traffic in a manner that makes per-
sistent mitigation after LFA events happen [10]. Gkounis
et al. also investigated the interplay of TE and LFA [11].
Woodpecker [12] proposed a centralized TE scheme based
on the upgraded nodes. Aydeger et al. proposed a SDN
based model leveraging TE dynamically to reroute traffic
on the suspected target links as long as it is congested [14].
However, adapting frequently changing routing policy for
all traffic on core network is not quite feasible, since it fails
to consider the network topology condition (such as band-
width) and its dependence on SDN makes it inapplicable
in real-world network. Generally speaking, these special TE
mitigations temporarily reroute legitimate traffic along with
flooding one to other links, which do not eliminate flooding
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traffic from the network, so they can only serve as a tem-
porary solution towards LFA. Kang et al. designed a SDN
based system, called SPIFFY [13], that leverages temporary
bandwidth extension to identify flooding traffic during LFA
happens. However, SPIFFY requires to extend bandwidth
of the bottlenecked core link in a short time (TBE) which
has imposed strong requirements for bandwidth and link
infrastructure.
Information oriented mitigation: Xue et al. proposed
LinkScope [8], a detecting system that employs both the
end-to-end and the hop-by-hop network measurement tech-
niques to capture abnormal path performance degradation
for detecting LFA. However, his work focuses on link state
monitoring which falls short in botnet tracing. Hence it has
limited effect on eliminating flooding traffic and picking out
the adversary. Hirayama et al. [16] regarded the traffic of
traceroute as the sign of a up-coming link-flooding attack,
so as to alarm the supervisor of ISP to deploy defence, but
only employing the increase of traceroute as the sign of
LFA probably leads to a high false-positive rate of alarming.
MoveNet [15] employs virtual networks to offer constant,
dynamic and threat-aware reallocation of critical network
resources to deceive attackers knowledge about critical net-
work resources, which provides an abstract methodology to
counter DDOS. However, it is merely a general framework
of DDOS mitigation, and corresponding mechanisms should
be added if MoveNet want to detect and mitigate LFA.
All the existing works focus on a temporary solution
that cannot thoroughly eliminate flooding traffic or prevent
them from entering target links. In addition, these solutions
only take effects after the network has been compromised,
even though some of them can backtrack the bots after
attacks happen. In contrast, we propose an preventively
LFA mitigation in this paper that can distinguish suspicious
traffic from legitimate traffic at an early stage and impose
special policies on them to mitigate LFA before target links
are compromised.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the link-flooding attack
(LFA), and then present the system model.
3.1 Link-flooding Attack (LFA)
LFA targets links in the core of the network and creates
a large number of attack flows crossing the targeted links
to flood and virtually disconnect them. There are mainly
two kinds of LFA: The first is the Coremelt attack [4]. It
utilizes bots to send attack traffic to other bots. This attack
leverage bot pairs, whose communication paths share the
links in the Internet core, to congest the network. And the
second is the Crossfire attack [5], which coordinates bots
to send legitimate-looking low-rate traffic to the attacker-
chosen publicly accessible servers (e.g., HTTP servers) in
a way that their routes cross the link targets in the core
Internet. Compared to the Coremelt attack, the Crossfire
attack exhibits a lower requirements for the location and
distribution of bots and therefore adversaries can manip-
ulate more bots to effectively attack the victim, so it is
more flexible and threatening. In particular, adversaries tend
to choose the latter when they target at large networks
(e.g., ISP), in which they are difficult to find and collude
enough bot pairs. Hence, we mainly focus on the Crossfire
attack in this paper and we employ LFA to denote such
kind of attacks. To compromise the victim, the adversary
first discovers the target links of the network and then
manipulates a large number of bots to isolate the targeted
victims from the Internet by flooding flows to the target
links. It can be described as the following two steps: link
information gathering and flooding.
Link information gathering: To launch LFA, the adver-
sary will use all his bots to query link information towards
as many servers in target area as possible. Usually the ad-
versary leverages network diagnostic tools (e.g., traceroute)
to gather layer-3 router links. The link information gathered
by the adversary is called linkmap. We call any host which
performs such link information querying for legitimate or
malicious purpose as a link-prober.
We argue that linkmap is different from network topol-
ogy [19]. The linkmap consists of all the 2-dimension router
information from source hosts to destination servers while
the network topology focuses on the infrastructure of 3-
dimension router physical connectively relationship. To be
precise, the linkmap describes the routing policy towards
the target area in the ISP. In order to figure out the best
attack-cost strategy, the adversary tends to attack links
which can be occupied by as many bots as possible be-
cause he can inject more junk traffic to these links. As a
consequence, links which can be attacked by enough bots
are chosen as target links.
Flooding: In this step, the adversary manipulates a
large number of bots to persistently send TCP-like flows
to congest the target links by consuming their bandwidth.
Note that a rational adversary will cautiously manipulate
his bots in a reasonable rate to avoid being detected by the
rate-based detecting mechanisms. In addition, the adversary
also constantly checks the target links to see whether they
are successfully congested.
3.2 System model
In this paper, as shown in Figure 1, we focus on networks
with two edges (ingress routers and egress routers). The
networks can be ISPs where servers in the target area are
linked with the egress routers to provide services to the
public. Hosts outside the network (on the left side) can
access the servers in the target area (on the right side) via
the ingress routers. In particular, the legitimate hosts as
well as the adversaries can visit the target area by using
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suitable protocols (e.g., hosts can establish communications
with web servers using HTTP).
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, adversaries tend to
choose the Crossfire attacks due to its flexibility. Hence, an
adversary need to manipulate a large number of bots to
obtain the linkmap of the network by sending probing flows
to the network. He figures out the target links between the
ingress/egress routers, and then launches LFA to the target
links in the target area.
4 LINKBAIT DESIGN
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism, called Linkbait,
to preventively mitigate LFA with active link obfuscation.
The key idea of Linkbait is to provide an obfuscated linkmap
to the adversary by imposing differential policies on probing
flows, and mislead attacks from bots to the faked target links
while hiding the true target links. Different from existing
LFA mitigation mechanisms, Linkbait is an preventively
attack mitigation mechanism that can early mitigate LFA
before it congests the network.
In this section, we first give a high-level overview of
Linkbait, and then elaborate on the design of Linkbait.
4.1 Linkbait Overview
The design principle of Linkbait components is to find sus-
ceptible target links and obfuscate traffic in them. To achieve
that, Linkbait consists of three components, as shown in
Figure 2: link sifting, link obfuscation and bot detection. In
link sifting, we check the flow distribution of all links in
the network to figure out the target links that may be
flooded by bots and also select appropriate links as bait
links to fake target links. Link obfuscation tries to provide
a fake linkmap for the adversary by selectively rerouting
of probing flows, so that the true target links are hidden
while the bait links will be misjudged as target links and
attacked by the adversary. It is worth noting that a bait
link contains multiple links which can efficiently mitigate
LFA to the bait link. Although LFA can be mitigated by
link obfuscation, we further leverage a supervised learning
algorithm to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate
hosts, and certain measures can be taken to reduce the junk
traffic going through the network.
4.2 Link Sifting
Link sifting1 aims to figure out potential target links of the
network and select appropriate links to fake target links. We
call the faked target link as bait links. To realize this purpose,
link sifting has two phases: link analysis and link grouping.
The former tries to obtain the whole network information
including all the links and their flow densities, and the latter
figures out the target links and select appropriate links to
form bait links.
4.2.1 Link Analysis
In this paper, we deem that a single link is a stable router
sequence from an ingress router to an egress router, which
serves as a communication channel between hosts and
servers in the target area. Since links in the ISP are dy-
namically changing and the ISP might well only possess
a coarse-grained linkmap, it is a difficult job, even for the
ISP itself, to gather fine-grained information needed by
Linkbait. Hence, we propose a method to obtain the whole
network information.
The method is called looking glass tracing (LG tracing),
which leverages existing network diagnostic tools (e.g.,
traceroute) to collect link information. In order to obtain the
complete link information in the network, the ISP needs to
hire a large number of hosts distributed in different locations
to trace links, which is expensive and impossible for a single
ISP due to its limited resources. Fortunately, there are many
public available servers maintained by other ISPs providing
traceroute services. We call these servers as LG servers and
they can be remotely accessed for the purpose of querying
routing information. These servers are distributed around
the world, which are similar to the distribution of bots.
Therefore, with the help of LG servers, LG tracing leverages
existing network diagnostic tools to collect link information
of the ISP [20]. As the adversary also uses existing network
diagnostic tools to obtain target links, the links we obtain
can cover the links obtained by the adversary as long as
the number of LG servers manipulated by the ISP is large
enough.
Flow density represents bandwidth utilization for links.
According to the universal power-law property of flow den-
sity distribution [5], the more flows can be created through
one link, the higher flow density it has. Thus, we estimate
the flow density of a link by calculating the number of LG
servers going through the link.
4.2.2 Link Grouping
After gathering the link information, we can compute the
flow density of each link and then figure out which links are
most likely to be flooded. In this paper, we use the algorithm
in [5] to figure out the true target links.
In order to hide the true target links from the adversary,
we select some links to fake target links and reroute the
probing flows of bots to these faked links. We call these
faked links as bait links. As a consequence, the adversary
will obtain a fake linkmap and misjudge the bait links as
1. Link sifting should not be confused with linkmap construction of
the adversary in [5], though they all gather links information towards a
specific area. Linkmap construction mainly focuses on discovering the
links which can be consumed by bots.
5the target links. Note that a bait link in our mechanism is
not a single link but is composed of several links. There are
two reasons to construct a bait link in this way. First, in
order to fake a target link, it should have large flow density
after flow rerouting. The most convenient way to realize this
purpose is to reroute the probing flows of multiple links to
one converge link. Second, the bait links will suffer from
flooding attacks from bots. The congestion can be reduced
if the attacks are distributed into multiple links of each
bait link. However, it is difficult to ensure that linkmap
obfuscation on these links can affect enough flows in the
network due to the limited link resources in some target
networks. To solve this problem, we must design a link
grouping algorithm that can cover as many as possible flows
in the network when minimize the “cost” of adding links
into bait links.
Problem Formulation: We formulate the link grouping
problem as a weighted set cover problem. Let fi denotes
each single flow sending from individual hosts to the target
network, and the total set of flows in the network is denoted
by F = {f1, f2, ..., fϕ}. For each links, there are several
flows going through it. Let T (li) = {fi1 , fi2 , · · · } be the
set of flows going through the link li. Suppose there are n
flows, so the flows going through all the links are denoted
by L = {T (l1), T (l2), ..., T (lN )}. It is obviously that
∪Ni=1T (li) = F
In the weighted set cover problem, defining a weight
function is very important. This nonnegative weight func-
tion w : L → R should reflect the cost of each link. A bait
link with less cost is supposed to obfuscate more flows than
others while their consumptions of link resources are the
same. Let bi denote a bait link and T (bi) is the set of flows
going through bi. Our objective is to find a set of bait links
which can minimize the total cost while covering as many
flows as possible. With this objective, the link grouping
problem is formulated as follows.
argmin
B
∑
bi∈B
w(bi)
s.t.
⋃
bi∈B
T (bi) = F
(1)
The weight of bi, w(bi), can be characterized by two
factors: the number of links in bi, and the flow density of
bi. Note that the flow density of bi, denoted by ρbi , is the
total number of flows in T (bi).
We first characterize the influence of ρbi to w(bi). Sup-
pose there are M hosts communicating with the target area.
Let F (hi) denote the set of flows between servers in the
target area and a host hi outside the target area. Therefore,
we have
M⋃
i=1
F (hi) = F =
N⋃
j=1
T (lj) (2)
Generally speaking, linkmap obfuscation can be formu-
lated as a Bernoulli experiment: for any hosts, pa approaches
the overall proportion of its flows obfuscated in the net-
work, which can be illustrated by Equation 3. Hence, higher
flow density of a bait link ρbi corresponds to a higher pa.
As a result, increasing flow density of bait links leads to a
larger amount of bots obfuscated by Linkbait.
pa ≈
∑
bi∈B
ρbi/‖F‖ (3)
However, nbi should not be too large for the following
reasons. Linkbait utilizes existing links in the target area
to construct bait links, but such link reuse is resource-
constrained. The smaller the target area is, the more difficult
to find sufficient links to meet the requirement of ρbi . Hence,
nbi should be kept small to ensure that bait links can be
flexibly implemented in networks of different size.
As a result, the weight w(bi) of a bait link bi should
consider both ρbi and nbi , which can be described as follows.
w(bi) ∝ nbi/ρbi (4)
Grouping algorithm: The weight set cover problem is
a well-known NP-hard problem [21]. Thus, the formulated
link grouping problem is a NP-hard problem. We propose a
greedy link grouping algorithm to solve the link grouping
problem. As we stated above, a bait link should increase
its flow density ρbi while maintain a small nbi . Hence, we
search for links to construct bait links according to two
principles. First, the links of a bait link can be chosen from
several normal links which support a certain amount of
traffic instead of links with very low flow density so that
we can increase ρbi . Second, to reduce nbi , partial flows
to true target links should also be rerouted to bait links.
Since true target links is of high ρbi , redirecting their flows
is an effective way to largely increase the ρbi while keep
nbi small at the same time. According to the principles of
selecting links, we design the link grouping algorithm. Its
formal description is stated as follows:
Algorithm 1 Greedy Link Grouping.
Input:
1: Total flows F ;
2: Flows grouped by links L;
3: Bait link coverage threshold τ ;
Output:
4: Bait link set B;
5: % initiate all sets
6: B← ∅
7: F
′ ← F
8: % add proper links into B
9: repeat
10: l← argmaxX∈L|X ∩ F |/w(X)
11: B ← B ∪ l, L← L\{l}, and F ′ ← F ′\L
12: until ‖B‖/‖F‖ > τ
In the greedy link grouping algorithm, Linkbait tries to
find the links that best match the two principles(i.e., the least
w) and combines them as bait links, until flows in bait links
have a satisfying coverage to the total flows in the network.
4.3 Linkmap Obfuscation
The adversary manipulates a large number of bots to cre-
ate probing flows to the network to obtain the linkmap.
6Linkmap obfuscation is proposed to provide a fake linkmap
to the adversary and use several bait links to fake target
links. To realize this purpose, link obfuscation is proposed
with two steps: link-prober identification and selectively
flow rerouting. It is worth noting that a link-prober can be
a bot or a legitimate host since a legitimate host may also
create probing flows to the network just like a bot does.
Therefore, the linkmap obfuscation should not affect the
objective of legitimate hosts.
4.3.1 Link-prober Identification
This step aims to identify all the link-probers and label their
probing flows for the rerouting purpose. As we mentioned
earlier, a link-prober can use network diagnostic tools to cre-
ate probing flows to query the IP information of every hop.
In particular, we focus on identifying the traffic generated by
traceroute since it is one of the most widely used network
diagnostic tools used by both adversaries and the legitimate
hosts (e.g., [16] also uses traffic of traceroute to detect links
attacked by LFA). It is worth noting that the framework of
link-prober also works for other network diagnostic tools
due to their similar traffic patterns.
The probing flows enter the network via the ingress
routers, so we can implement a real-time monitoring on
the ingress traffic to identify the probing flows. However,
frequent operations on the ingress routers will introduce
heavy burden to them and increase network latency, so we
separate the flows towards the target area from numerous
traffic and mirror them into a SPAN switch. In this paper, we
leverage the SDN controller to analyze the mirrored traffic
instead of performing this work on the ingress routers. The
controller will examine all the flows through the SPAN
switch and identify the probing flows according to the
unique features of traceroute.
The probing flows generated by traceroute have two
unique features: repeated invalid destination port and dif-
ferent TTL from the same source, which can help us to
distinguish the probing flows from other TCP-like flows.
Traceroute leverages ICMP Time Exceeded message re-
sponded from routers to discover IP-level nodes along
router paths. Hence, it continuously sends packets with
different TTL values. In addition, traceroute must choose the
destination UDP port number to be an unlikely value (e.g.,
>30,000), making it improbable that an application at the
destination is using that port [22]. When traceroute receives
a “port unreachable”, it knows its task has finished.
Bots that send a sequence of packets containing different
TTL and invalid dest ports, to collect link information
toward the target area, differ a lot from those legitimate
hosts. Since the links to transform traffic from specific areas
are always stable (or several hops fluctuation), traffic from
normal users (not link-probers) always arrive the ingress of
ISP with a comparatively stable TTL as well as a valid dest
port, while traffic from link-probers must carry different
TTL as well as invalid dest ports. With these two unique
features, we can distinguish the probing flows from other
flows, and the hosts creating probing flows will be identified
as link-probers. Even if the adversary perceives the existence
of Linkbait and mutates his probe traffic (e.g., randomizing
TTL or prolonging the interval between each packet) to
Target link
Fig. 3. Rerouting policy for probing flows to a target link. Black lines
which are entering the target link are legitimate flows whereas the red
one are labeled probing flows.
Converge  link
Bait  
link
Fig. 4. Rerouting policy for probing flows to a bait link. Black lines
entering the bait link are legitimate, and the red one are labeled probing
flows
evade from identification, Linkbait can still pick out these
probers. This situation will be discussed in Section 5.
After identifying the link-probers, flow tables are in-
stalled on the ingress routers to label probing flows of link-
probers in a real-time manner. Note that only probing flows
of link-probers are labeled while TCP-like flows of link-
probers are not modified. These labeled probing flows will
be recognized and rerouted in the next step.
4.3.2 Selectively Flow Rerouting
In order to provide a fake linkmap to the adversary, we pro-
pose a selectively flow rerouting policy to reroute probing
flows accordingly. The basic idea is to reduce probing flows
to the target links and increase probing flows to the bait
links, so that the bait links will be misjudged as target links
by the adversary. We emphasize that only probing flows
will be rerouted while other TCP-like flows from the link-
probers or other hosts will not be labeled or rerouted. In
particular, we have different rerouting policies for probing
flows to the target links and the bait links respectively.
Rerouting policy for probing flows to the target link:
The true target links are obtained by Linkbait in link sifting.
We would like to reroute the probing flows to the target
links to other links randomly, so that the adversary cannot
figure out the true target links. In order to hide the target
links from the adversary, we associate a set of links to
each target link, which are called branch links. The branch
links can be any links in the network which should have
small communication latency with the target link. For each
probing flow to the target link, as shown in Figure 3, it will
be randomly rerouted to one of the branch links of the target
link. This random rerouting policy reduces the flow density
to each target link, and makes the link information changes
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Fig. 5. Illustration of selectively rerouting of probing flows.
dynamically to link-probers so they cannot figure out the
true target links.
Rerouting policy for probing flows to the bait link:
We intend to use bait links to fake target links, so that the
adversary will be misled. In our mechanism, a bait link is
not a single link, but contains several links. In order to fake
a target link, for the links in a bait link, the one with the
largest bandwidth will be selected as the converge link. As
shown in Figure 4, for any probing flow to the links of a bait
link, it will be rerouted to the coverage link of the bait link.
This will increase the flow density of the coverage link and
mislead the judgement of the adversary.
Figure 5 illustrates how the probing flows from the bots
of the adversary to the target area are selectively rerouted.
According to the rerouting policy, only the probing flows
(denoted by the red dashed) through the target link will be
randomly distributed to its branch links, and the probing
flows through the links of a bait link will be converged
to its converge link, while the TCP-like flows (denoted by
black lines) still go through their original links without
any rerouting. Note that branch links of a target link can
belong to a bait link. This selectively flow rerouting has
several advantages. First, the true target links will be hidden
and protected. Second, the bait links will be misjudged as
target links by the adversary. Moreover, when the adversary
launch attacks to the bait links with TCP-like flows, these
flows will not be rerouted and still go through their original
links. As a consequence, neither the true target links nor the
bait links will be congested by the adversary, so that LFA
becomes useless.
We emphasize that only probing flows will be rerouted
while other flows from the link-probers will not be labeled
or rerouted. If we rerouted all the flows, although the true
target links is hidden from the adversary, the converge
link of each bait link will be congested by LFA. It is also
worth noting that legitimate hosts will not be influenced by
selectively flow rerouting. The objective of legitimate hosts
is to testify the router-level connectivity, which is different
from the objectives of the adversary who wants to obtain
the linkmap and the target links. Since selectively flow
rerouting only modifies partial hops in a link, traceroute
with legitimate purpose can still obtain a valid result.
The linkmap obfuscation component plays the role
of traffic monitor and flow injector in the network. In
this paper, we leverage Differentiated Services Code Point
(DSCP) [23], which can be agilely adapted into traditional
network and generates little disturbances to legitimate
users, to deploy linkmap obfuscation component (Please
refer to Section 5.2 for the details). During the link-prober
identification stage, DSCP is introduced to label the probing
flows. The probing flows, marked as a special services in
DSCP by ingress routers, will be transmitted by normal
routers in ISP, while flows with the special label, will be
discriminated by the router in bait links and target links.
As a consequence, these links can redirect probing flows
according to different policies. Hence, once probing flows
enter bait links or target links, it will be redirected so as to
obfuscate routes. Note that the DSCP method is only one of
various solutions to deploy Linkbait, other suitable methods
can be adopted if necessary.
4.4 Bot detection
Different from exiting LFA mitigation mechanisms, Linkbait
can actively mitigate LFA by link obfuscation even without
the effort of bot detection. However, the network still suffers
from junk traffic generated by the bots. In this section, we
further propose the bot detection component to accurately
distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. It is worth noting that
bot detection of Linkbait is different from that of existing
schemes. Since we issue early warning about suspicious
bots before links are congested, we can leverage routing
policies (e.g., TE) to regulate their flows instead of simply
preventing them from entering our network. In this way,
these legitimate hosts who are identified as malicious bots
by Linkbait will not be severely disturbed.
The biggest difference between bots and legitimate link-
probers is that the former tries to dig out as many links as
possible while the latter only queries one or two links at one
time. Generally speaking, an adversary spends a relatively
long time to construct the linkmap since the probing flows
were gradually generated by a large number of bots. Once
the linkmap is obtained, the adversary will fully utilizes
all his bots to flood the target links with TCP-like flows.
With our link obfuscation, the adversary will converge
his junk flows into bait links at the same time. In this
paper, we propose to leverage the unique patterns during
the linkmap construction phase and the flooding phase to
accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. In partic-
ular, we monitor the long-term traceroute traffic and also
continuously monitor the short-term flooding traffic with a
sliding window. By combining these features, we leverage a
supervised learning algorithm to accurately distinguish bots
from legitimate hosts.
4.4.1 Feature extraction
We extract two features corresponding to the unique traf-
fic patterns of the bots during the flooding phase and
the linkmap construction phase. The first feature is called
flooding matrix, which represents the short-term flooding
traffic patterns of a link-prober. The second feature is called
traceroute matrix, which represents the long-term traffic
patterns for linkmap construction of a link-prober. It is
worth noting that the flooding matrix is the main feature
8that we extract and the traceroute matrix, which aims at
decreasing the false-positive rate, is an optional choice for
Linkbait. Hence, the bot detection is still effective even
though traceroute matrix is not perfectly gathered. This
situation will be discussed in Section 5.4.
Flooding Matrix (FM): Once the linkmap is obtained, the
adversary will fully utilize all its bots to flood the target
links with TCP-like flows. FM represents the flooding be-
haviors of a host which accesses links during the flooding
phase. However, it is unknown to us when the adversary
will launch the flooding attacks. To solve this problem, we
use a sliding window to continuously detect the flooding
behaviors. Note that any host is suspected of being a bot
even if it is not a link-prober, hence every host which
accesses links should have FMs.
A sliding window consists of n intervals and the sliding
windows moves with one interval each time. Let Ii denote
the ith interval of a sliding window. We use fsij to represent
the traffic, denoted by the number of bytes, going through
linki during Ij . The FM for a host i during a sliding window
can be represented as follows.
FMhosti =

I1 I2 · · · In
link1 fs11 fs12 · · · fs1n
link2 fs21 fs22 · · · fs2n
...
...
... · · · ...
linkm fsm1 fsm2 · · · fsmn
 (5)
As the sliding windows moves, we can obtain a lot of
FMs for each host.
Traceroute Matrix (TM): TM represents the traceroute be-
haviors of a link-prober during a detection period DT
whereas DT is divided into multiple subperiods. Let Ti
denote the ith subperiod of DT . For each link-prober, we
use ftij to represent the traceroute frequency of the link-
prober towards linki during Tj .
Suppose there are m links and n subperiods. Thus, the
TM for a host i is represented as follows.
TMhosti =

T1 T2 · · · Tn
link1 ft11 ft12 · · · ft1n
link2 ft21 ft22 · · · ft2n
...
...
... · · · ...
linkm ftm1 ftm2 · · · ftmn
 (6)
Therefore, each link-prober has a TM to represent the
traffic pattern during the detection period of DT . The value
of DT depends on how much time spent by the adversary
to construct the linkmap, which varies from an adversary to
another. Generally speaking, link distribution dynamically
changes due to load-balancing, so the adversary will launch
LFA immediately after linkmap construction. We set DT to
be 5 days since adversaries usually take less than 5 days to
obtain the linkmap. Note that DT cannot be too large or too
small. If DT is too small, we cannot discover the traceroute
behaviors of all bots manipulated by the adversary since it
gradually uses bots to obtain the linkmap. While if DT is
too large, too much efforts are wasted for monitoring the
large traffic in the network.
4.4.2 Classification
With the extracted features, we then leverage a supervised
classification algorithm to distinguish bots from legitimate
hosts. Each link-prober has one TM and many FMs while
other hosts only have FMs. In particular, we combine all
FMs together to form the joint-FM for each host. In our
experiments, we collect a ground truth dataset where each
sample has a label to indicate the corresponding host is a bot
or a legitimate user (e.g., 0 indicates a bot and 1 indicates a
legitimate user). We divide the ground truth dataset into a
training set and a testing set. The training set is used to train
a supervised classifier which then predicts the label of each
sample in the testing set. The classification accuracy can be
calculated by comparing the predicted labels of samples
in the testing set with their true labels. In particular, a
linear multiclass Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier
implemented by libSVM3 [24] is employed for accurate
classification.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we first analyze why the adversary cannot
congest the network under Linkbait, and then discuss the
feasibility of identifying the link-probers under various
circumstances. At last, we discuss the effectiveness when
adversaries perceive Linkbait.
5.1 Influence Linkbait can exert on adversaries
The adversary aims at disjointing connections between the
target area and Internet, so it tends to congest as many links
as possible by using a limited number of bots. Suppose each
bot has an upstream bandwidth U .
LFA without Linkbait: To saturate a target link with
bandwidth B, the adversary utilizes Np = B/U bots whose
flows can go through the target link. Using Np bots guar-
antees a robust congestion even if there is no legitimate
flows in the link. We consider this as an ideal condition
because not every bot can be fully utilized in common
situations. Some bots are not able to congest target links
chosen by the adversary, so that they keep unused in the
attack. Let us denote the amount of these unused bots as
Nun (Nun  Np). Thus, the number Nb of bots which the
adversary need to finish the attack to a target area including
n target links is calculated as
Nb = n ·Np +Nun (7)
LFA with Linkbait: Linkbait hides the true target links
and misleads the attacks of the adversary to the bait links.
Since the target links are hidden from the adversary, so they
would not be attacked or congested. In our experiments, as
shown in Table 1, we found that almost all the traffic to the
target area go through the limited number of target links. In
other words, once the target links are protected, the traffic
to the the target area would not be congested.
Let us then consider the attack to the bait links. Suppose
a bait link consists of M normal links. When the adversary
created TCP-like flows to congest the bait link, the flows will
be distributed to M links for each bait link. Let αiB denote
the bandwidth of the i link of a bait link. In order to congest
9the bait link, the adversary is supposed to useNl bots which
is calculated as follows.
Nl =
α1B + α2B + · · ·+ αMB
U
=
M∑
i=1
αiNp (8)
That is, the number of bots required to flood a bait link is∑M
i=1 αiNp. We can observe that if αi = 1, the attack cost of
the adversary has been forced to increase from Np to MNp.
Moreover, the more number of links to form a bait link, the
higher the attack cost is required for the adversary.
5.2 Linkbait is feasible in real-world networks
In this section, we discuss whether Linkbait is feasible in
real-world applications. We mainly discuss it from two
perspectives: the simplicity of implementing Linkbait and
little disturbances on legitimate users.
In Linkbait, we choose DSCP, which is served as the
identifier of flows, to build the link obfuscation component.
Employing DSCP to build Linkbait has the following ad-
vantages. First, DSCP has been widely supported by most
vendors (e.g., Cisco [25] and Huawei [26]), so Linkbait based
on DSCP is compatible with current hardwares. Second,
given that DSCP has been employed by ISP for many
purposes, such as load-balancing, reconfiguring DSCP to
adapt Linkbait requires no more effort than simply adding
one rule even in large scale networks, which reduces the
burden of deployment and maintenance. Third, the logical
structure of linkmap obfuscation component, which consists
of an ingress monitor and distributed obfuscation injectors,
can be rendered by DSCP perfectly.
For the little disturbances on legitimate users, there are
two situations to consider. When network failures happen
outside the obfuscation areas, traceroute with legitimate
purpose (e.g., network diagnosis) can still obtain a valid
result and thus figure out the node of failures, because selec-
tively flow rerouting only modifies partial hops which only
distribute in obfuscation areas. Once nodes which cause
the failure are from obfuscation areas, various recovering
mechanisms are provided by DSCP can agilely handle the
failures so as to fast recover its network usability.
5.3 Link-prober identification is versatile to various
probers
In Linkbait, we identify a host as a link-prober if it re-
peatedly creates flows to reach every hop of a link. The
identification is feasible because the fact that a link-prober
can only fetch informations of one hop in a link every time
he requests if he wants to obtain link information towards
the target area.
As we have mentioned, the adversary uses network
diagnostic tools to collect link information of the network.
The most significant characteristic of these tools is that it
probes only one hop every time. This is due to the intrinsical
nature of Internet routing protocols that packets will be
informed the next hop only after reaching a router. Since
a link-prober has no idea where his packet will be directed,
he must query hops in the link repeatedly using tools like
traceroute. Hence, the probing flows reveal the same feature
no matter which network diagnostic tools are used.
In addition to that, it is the complicated hop discovering
pattern, which the adversary must obey, that reliefs the real-
time reacting requirement for Linkbait. Since the adversary
requires a comparatively long time to discover an entire link,
Linkbait has enough time to perform traffic analysis and
identify the probers before real links are disclosed.
5.4 Case study: What if adversaries perceive the exis-
tence of Linkbait
In most situations, adversaries perform link-probe stage
in a comparatively constant period. However, once the
adversary perceives the existence of Linkbait, he might
launch link-probe in a very flexible way so as to evade
from the sliding windows based detection. In the following,
three different methods of link-probe are presented and we
discuss the effectiveness of Linkbait against them.
Prolonging interval between each link-probe: An ad-
versary might probe links in a very long time interval using
a large number of bots. Once a bot can send intermittent
probes in a long time period and escape from the detection
window, it seems that Linkbait cannot detect these bots.
However, this is not true for Linkbait.
Firstly, we combine two features to perform fine-grained
bot detection. Even TM can be annulled by the adversaries’
countermeasure, FM which reflects the short-time flooding
pattern during the flooding stage of the adversary will still
remain effective, since the adversary must launch attacks
with all his bots at the same time in order to deplete the
bandwidth. In the absence of TM generated by traceroute,
the detection accuracy can still be satisfying, which pos-
sesses a bot detection rate higher than 86%. The probe
feature which aims at improving detection accuracy is just
an optional choice for Linkbait. Therefore, Linkbait’s effec-
tiveness will not be diminished without it. As we have
mentioned in bot detection, Linkbait can actively mitigate
LFA by link obfuscation even without the effort of bot
detection. Even though bots might escape from detection
windows, they still get deceived. The floods towards a bait
will encounter no more than stable transmission. Secondly,
the linkmap accuracy of long-term probing suffers from
inevitably periodic link changes in ISP, which diminishes
the adversaries’ threats.
Randomizing packet headers for each packet: The
attacker can also randomize header of packets to evade
from link-prober identification. But it is in vain due to the
fundamental differences between the link-probe of bots and
normal access. By repeatedly sending the same TTL from
one bot, the adversary seems to mask the fact that his
bots carry changing TTL. However, it exacerbates the other
feature, the invalid ports. Hence, Linkbait can still find out
the bots.
One in all link-probe: It is common for a adversary to
compromise a large network and manipulate all hosts in
the network. Since these bots share the same or nearby IP
segments, they also share similar links towards the target
area. Hence it is feasible for the adversary to reduce the
risk of being captured by reducing the number of bots
performing link-probe. He can just employ partial bots in
the network instead of all to perform link-probe and then
launch the attack with all bots. In this way, the bots which
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Fig. 6. Geographical distribution for LG servers of Telia (red pins) and
Cogentco (blue pins).
do not perform link-probe do escape from the link-prober
identification. However, once the bots which perform link-
probe are identified, the whole IP segment can be marked
as suspected. Linkbait can still identify the suspected bots
which belong to these IP segment during the flooding. When
these bots try to compromise the bait links, restricts can be
imposed on them so as to remove these junk traffic out of
the network.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Linkbait
by using both real-world experiments and large-scale sim-
ulations. In particular, we first implement link sifting in
real-world networks to show the feasibility of deploying
Linkbait in a real ISP. We then implement a prototype on a
real SDN testbed to see whether Linkbait can obfuscate the
linkmap while maintaining a low network latency. Finally,
we simulate large-scale LFA and evaluate the accuracy of
bot detection with large-scale simulations.
6.1 Internet-scale Link Sifting
Bait links are the key to the success of Linkbait, which can
fake target links and selectively reroute flows. Therefore, we
implement link sifting in real-world Internet to see whether
we can find enough bait links to attract the attention of the
adversary.
We choose five places as the target areas in Internet.
In particular, five ASes scattering in the United States are
chosen in our experiments. We leverage 126 LG servers
provided by Telia [27] and Cogentco [28] to launch LG
tracing. Both of them provide web interfaces for users to
run traceroute. As seen in Figure 6, these LG servers are
globally distributed in 33 countries, and 68 of these servers
are provided by Telia while 58 are provided by Cogentco.
By using globally distributed LG servers we could find as
many paths as possible whose destinations are the ASes we
choose.
6.1.1 Basic link information
The basic link information of the five ASes are collected
using LG tracing, and the detailed information for each
AS is shown in Table 1. The Avg Hop Num represents the
average number of hops in all paths towards each AS. The
Non-identical Path represents the number of different links
from all LG servers to each AS. The flow density of a link is
TABLE 1
Basic link information for 5 ASes.
PPPPPArea
Info Avg Hop Num Non-identical Paths Coverage of Top-15flow-density links
AS1 12 603 1.0
AS2 12 804 0.84
AS3 16 497 1.0
AS4 14 353 1.0
AS5 12 792 0.81
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Fig. 7. Time for traceroute.
estimated by the times it appears in the results of traceroute
of all the LG servers. The Coverage of Top-15 flow-density links
is the fraction of the number of LG servers which can access
the top 15 highest flow density links to the total number of
LG servers. It can be used to estimate the flow distribution
of the network. As seen in Table I, the coverage for AS1, AS3
and AS4 reach 100% because almost all paths from different
LG servers to each AS share the same link at the end servers,
making the coverage 100%. The network size can be seen
from the non-identical paths. We observe that AS4 has the
least number of paths whereas AS2 has the most, which
indicates that AS3 is the smallest network whereas AS2 is
the largest. In this way, we can guarantee that our algorithm
works for various network topologies.
6.1.2 Traceroute time cost
To investigate the relationship between link latency and the
scale of ASes, we show the time spent of every single hop
for each AS during traceroute in Figure 7. We can see that
the longest time spent for one hop is 6.14s due to network
latency, whereas the lowest is 0.076s. The average time spent
for discovering one node of all 5 ASes is 1.72s. Combining
with Table 1, we observe that networks with more number
of non-identical paths have a longer average time cost on
every hop. This is because more number of non-identical
paths leads to a more complex and larger network, which
possesses a comparatively long geographical distance and
therefore a large latency.
6.1.3 Link coverage
As we mentioned, link sifting tries to hide the target links
and find as many bait links as possible to obfuscate target
links with the least cost. Link coverage here is estimated
by the fraction of the number of LG servers which can be
obfuscate by bait links to the total number of LG servers. The
higher the link coverage, the better obfuscation the network.
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In our experiments, we measure the link coverage for the
5 ASes with our grouping algorithm. Since the minimum
number of links to form a bait link NLth demonstrates
resistibility of Linkbait against flood, we changeNLth while
maintaining the least cost with our grouping algorithm. It is
worth noting that we cannot obtain the actual bandwidth or
the flow density of links, ρbi , in ISP, so we use the fraction
of the number of LG servers that can travel through the link
to estimate. Figure 8 shows the link coverage against the
variation of NLth. We can see that the link coverage de-
creases as NLth increases, which is because less links in the
network are chosen to form bait links. However, almost for
all ASes, the link coverage can reach 70% when NLth ≤ 4.
The only exception is AS4 which mainly because its small-
scale network has limited number of links for sifting. Based
on these observations, we argue that link sifting can realize
a satisfying linkmap obfuscation with an appropriate NLth
that makes Linkbait stable enough.
6.2 Evaluation using Real Testbed
We then implement Linkbait in a real testbed to evaluate
its performance. In particular, we focus on the rerouting
latency introduced by Linkbait since our mechanism should
not affect legitimate hosts or be perceived by the adversary.
Therefore, the lower latency introduced by Linkbait, the
better link obfuscation to the adversaries. Thus, we build
Linkbait on a real testbed to evaluate the rerouting latency.
6.2.1 Prototype Implementation
We employ software defined network (SDN) to implement
the DSCP based network prototype over physical nodes
and links provided by Cloudlab [29]. Cloudlab provides
physical machines across three sites around the United
States: Utah, Wisconsin, and South Carolina. It also provides
2× 10Gbps network interfaces to every node via SDN. It is
worth noting that SDN is not the prerequisite of Linkbait
implementation, since the DSCP method can be deployed in
traditional networks as well. We implement Linkbait on the
Floodlight [30] controller. We use OVS [31] to virtualize layer-
2 switches which support OpenFlow 1.3 [32] to perform
selectively rerouting. Note that links in our experiments
consist of layer-3 routers whereas only rerouting sites are
implemented as switches. In addition, we leverage iPerf [33]
to emulate the legitimate TCP-like flows in the network.
We build a experimental network with two edges
(ingress/egress routers) in the prototype. We build such a
network because its structure is similar to a simplified ISP
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Fig. 9. Real-time RTT change for legitimate hosts. Traceroute is per-
formed at 11.6s.
Fig. 10. An example of traceroute on Wikipedia.org.
network. A bait link with three parallel links is deployed
between the edges. Among the three link, there is a con-
verge link Lc for link obfuscation, and there is another link
Lo through which both link-probers and legitimate users
communicate with the target area. In addition, there is a link
Ll which only contains legitimates flows. It is worth noting
that the effect of flow rerouting can be demonstrated even
with only one bait link, since rerouting in a large system just
uses a combination of several bait links.
6.2.2 Rerouting Latency
The Rerouting latency is an important metric for evaluating
the performance of Linkbait. On one hand, the network jitter
caused by rerouting should not disturb legitimate hosts. On
the other hand, since latency may produce a deviation for
the result of link-probers (traceroute), we should reduce this
jitter in case the adversary perceives that the linkmap has
been faked.
Rerouting Impact on legitimate hosts. To investigate the
impact on legitimate hosts, we measure Round-Trip Time
(RTT) during three different stages in Linkbait. Figure 9
illustrates the RTT change for legitimate hosts. The link Lo
supports all link-probers’ traffic before 11.6s. Our mecha-
nism identifies and reacts immediately after a link-prober
performs traceroute at 11.6s. The response time includes
the time for link-prober identification and the time for
pushing corresponding labeling flow table to Openflow-
enabled switches. As shown in Figure 9, legitimate hosts
who communicate with the target area via Lo experience a
temporary block. However, RTT quickly returns to a normal
value when Linkbait handles traceroute of the link-prober.
Rerouting Impact on Link-probers. To investigate the
impact on link-probers, we record the result of traceroute
during rerouting policy takes effect. Figure 10 demonstrates
an example of traceroute to wikipedia.org. When traceroute
runs, traceroute outputs the list of traversed routers in a
simple text format, together with the timing information.
With the list of routers, a link-prober restores a link. In
addition, the link-prober can observe whether every hop
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Fig. 11. The timing information of traceroute time cost in a probing
flow rerouting period. Each line reflects traceroute latency fluctuation as
time changes for every hop. Blue lines represent changes for Linkbait
whereas red lines are the baselines without our defending policy.
works fine according to its traceroute delay. An abnormal
delay may alert the adversary, which leads to a failed
obfuscation.
Figure 11 shows the timing information for traceroute
command with and without our rerouting policy. We create
probing flows every 7 ms into the network. Each blue line
shows the average router response time for each hop of a
probing flow with the rerouting policy. Each red line shows
the average router response time for each hop of a probing
flow without rerouting policy, which is considered as a
baseline.
From Figure 11, we observe that probing flows expe-
rience an inevitable temporary block around the second
hop when Linkbait starts to reroute its flow to Lc. This is
because the rerouting operation occurs at that hop. We also
observe that the latency of the following hops drops quickly,
which indicates that our rerouting policy only blocks several
hops rather than the whole link. Hence, Linkbait achieves a
robust flow rerouting from Lo to Lc. We also observe that
time spent for querying every hop with the rerouting policy
only slightly differs from that of baselines. The average time
spent for every hop is 1.32ms whereas that of baselines is
1.24ms. As a consequence, Linkbait seamlessly obfuscates
a linkmap before adversaries obtain the real one. In this
experiment, we evaluate the effect of Linkbait on network
delay over physical nodes. Our system generates a short
delay to identify traceroute and deploy rerouting policy
before network delay backs to normal.
6.3 Evaluation using Large-scale Simulation
In this section, we further evaluate the performance of bot
detection of Linkbait by using large-scale simulations. We
use the real link information collected from the real-world
Internet in Section 6.1 in the experiments of simulations. We
deploy 100 bots, 190 legitimate hosts and 20 servers in the
target area. The legitimate hosts send packets to servers at
different rates in order to get services from them. The bots
send flooding flows to launch LFA to the servers.
In Linkbait, we extract the FM and TM features and use
SVM to distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. The evalua-
tion mainly focus on (1) bot detection rate and (2) false-positive
rate. Let TP denote the number of correctly identified bots,
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Fig. 12. The impact of the percentage of data used for training on the
performance of bot detection when joint-FM features or fused FM-TM
features are used.
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Fig. 13. The impact of confidence threshold on the performance of bot
detection when joint-FM features or fused FM-TM features are used.
TN denote the number of correctly identified legitimate
hosts, FP denote the number of legitimate hosts wrongly
identified as bots, FN denote the number of bots wrongly
identified as legitimate hosts. Then, the bot detection rate is
defined as
bot detection rate =
TP
TP + FN
. (9)
The false-positive rate is defined as
false-positive rate =
FP
TN + FP
. (10)
We expect that the bot detection rate should be as high as
possible while the false-positive rate should be as low as
possible.
Performance vs. Data used for training: We first evaluate
the performance against the percentage of data used for
training. Figure 12 shows the bot detection performance
against the percentage of joint-FM features or fused FM-TM
features used for training. The bot detection rate increases
and the false-positive rate decreases as the percentage of
data used for training increases. This is because the SVM
classifier is more accurate with larger amount of training
data. We can also observe that the bot detection rate using
fused features is better than using only joint-FM features un-
der the same parameters. The false-positive rate using fused
features is lower than using only joint-FM features under
the same parameters. Therefore, it is better to combine joint-
FM and TM together to accurately distinguish bots from
legitimate hosts. When 80% data are used for training, the
bot detection rate can reach 88.5% while the false-positive
rate drops under 7.5%.
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TABLE 2
Mechanism comparison.
````````Scheme
Feature Technology Traffic Affected Time to take effect Adversary-Detecting Method Need Collaboration
Linkbait Moving Target Defense Partial traffic Before congestion Machine Learning N
Spiffy Traffic Engineering All traffic On congestion Temporary Bandwidth Expansion N
CoDef Collaborative routing All traffic On congestion Rerouting Compliance Test Y
Liaskos Traffic Engineering All traffic On congestion Traffic Engineering Optimal Mapping N
Performance vs. Confidence Threshold CTsvm: The label
of a new sample predicted by SVM classifier is attached
with a confidence score which indicates the confidence level
of predicting the sample as that category. We only treat
the predicted bots as real bots when the confidence score
of predicted bots is larger than a Confidence Threshold
CTsvm. Figure 13 shows the impact of confidence threshold
on the performance of bot detection when 70% data are
used for training. We can see that both the bot detection
rate and the false-positive rate decrease as the confidence
threshold increases. This is because more low-confidence
bots judgements are refused when CTsvm is higher. As a
result, less legitimate hosts are wrongly identified as bots
and suspected bots are more likely to slip away. We can
also observe that using TM and FM features together can
achieves better performance than using joint-FM features
only. When CTsvm is 0.6, the false-positive rate is near 5%
while the bot detection rate is still above 80%. Note that the
detection accuracy can still be satisfying even without TM
features.
If bots are detected, ISP can employ various methods to
eliminate their flooding traffic from the network in a low
false-positve rate. It is worth nothing that LFA only occurs
on bait links. As we illustrate in Section 5.1, bait links with
Linkbait can resist congestion with its extended bandwidth.
Hence, LFA can be early mitigated before it takes effects on
true target links.
6.4 Comparison with Existing Schemes
In this section, we compare Linkbait with the state-of-the-art
of LFA mitigating schemes (e.g., Spiffy [13], CoDef [9] and
Liaskos [10]).
Table 2 shows their comparisons from five aspects. All
the other three mechanisms are based on TE while Linkbait
is inspired by MTD and uses link obfuscation to mitigate the
effects of LFA. Linkbait only reroutes the probing flows, and
the normal TCP flows will not be affected while the other
three mechanisms affect all the traffic flows. Time to take effect
tells us when the system starts to handle LFA. As a matter
of fact, the earlier the system reacts, the little congestion
the network will suffer. In particular, Linkbait uses link
obfuscation to mitigate LFA before the attacks congest the
links while the other mechanisms take effect when the
attacks already happen. Also, Linkbait can be implemented
by one single ISP without no collaboration with other ISPs,
which reduces the cost and complexity. Therefore, we can
conclude that Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA before the
the network is congested without affecting legitimate flows,
and has low implementation cost and high bot detection
rate.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Linkbait to actively mitigate LFA
by providing a fake linkmap to the adversary. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to early mitigate LFA before
congestion happens, which is total different from existing
works that mitigate LFA after the links are comprised by
adversaries. The core of Linkbait is link obfuscation that
selectively reroutes probing flows to hide target links from
adversaries and mislead them to consider bait links as
target links. Furthermore, we extract unique traffic features
from both the linkmap construction phase and the flooding
phase, and leverage SVM to accurately distinguish bots from
legitimate hosts. The experiments with real-world testbed
and large-scale simulations demonstrate the feasibility and
effectiveness of Linkbait. The experimental results show
that Linkbait introduces a very small rerouting latency and
achieves a high bot detection rate while maintaining a low
false positive rate.
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